Abstract-In 2005 an earthquake in northern Pakistan led to a significant inflow of international relief groups. Four years later, trust in Europeans and Americans was markedly higher among those exposed to the earthquake and the relief that followed. These differences reflect the greater provision of foreign aid and foreigner presence in affected villages rather than preexisting population differences or a general impact of disasters on trust. We thus demonstrate large-scale, durable attitudinal change in a representative Muslim population. Trust in Westerners among Muslims is malleable and not a deeply rooted function of preferences or global (as opposed to local) policy and actions.
I. Introduction
L OW levels of trust between and within communities can have an impact on economic performance through a self-reinforcing cycle: norms of behavior in low-trust environments lead to institutional change that persists and creates further entrenchment of such attitudes (Nunn, 2008; Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011) .
1 Whether communities can break such cycles of mistrust and the processes that allow them to do so remains a critical question. We examine trust between two populations, Pakistan and the West, where historical antecedents, increasing terrorism, and the accompanying antiterrorist actions from the United States have created precisely such a cycle of mistrust in recent times. 2 If trust is malleable in this context and between these two populations, this would plausibly suggest similar or greater malleability in other situations.
The specifics are as follows. In 2005, a large earthquake struck a remote region in Pakistan, immediately followed by a significant inflow of foreigners who provided relief and aid to the affected population. As we will show, the earthquake devastated the regions where it struck hardest, but the effects died off within 40 kilometers from the fault line. To exploit this variation in exposure to the earthquake-and therefore face-to-face contact with foreigners-we returned to the region four years later and collected large-scale survey data from 126 villages at varying distances from the fault line. These data combine information from a shorter census of 28,297 households and longer survey data from 2,456 households in these villages.
In our data, exposure to the earthquake, measured as the distance of the household to the fault line, increases levels of trust in Westerners from those typically found in Pakistan (one of the lowest in the world) to those found in Sweden (one of the highest in the world). The durable attitudinal change we document shows, for the first time, considerable malleability in trust toward Westerners in a large Muslim population. We argue that foreign aid and, more specifically, direct face-to-face interactions with Westerners in their roles as aid providers are plausible channels for the observed increase in trust.
Our claim that the earthquake led to a causal increase in trust in Westerners hinges on the assumption that trust prior to the earthquake was not correlated with distance to the activated fault line. This assumption may not hold if preexisting differences in populations living close to the fault line were correlated with trust; examples include differential levels of education, wealth, or risk aversion. Using data from a census of villages before the earthquake, as well as household characteristics that were predetermined (e.g., adult education) in our surveys, we first confirm no correlations between characteristics before the earthquake and distance to the fault line.
We then show that our results are robust to a number of additional checks, relevant for any analysis of large natural disasters on population outcomes. First, we compute the distance from each household to all 35 potential fault lines in the region and compare households that were living equally close to different fault lines, each with a similar ex ante likelihood of becoming active. Our results are fully robust to this additional placebo test: trust in Westerners is affected only among those living close to the affected fault line, rather than any fault line. Second, we combine survey data on household composition before and after the earthquake with a bounding exercise to show that our estimates are robust to differential mortality and migration. Finally, instead of the distance to the fault line, we use the Mercalli intensity, which assesses the intensity of the earthquake at each point, as an alternate measure of the earthquake's force. Our results are again robust to this alternate measure; however, we also show that the Mercalli intensity does not satisfy exogeneity restrictions as it depends on soil characteristics that are correlated with population size and housing construction in our sample.
Whether on-the-ground relief by Western relief agencies and individuals was the relevant channel through which the earthquake causally increased trust in Westerners is harder to identify. If disasters increase trust generally, we may mistakenly attribute this ''disaster-led'' trust increase to foreign relief and aid. To address this possibility, we elicited trust levels toward various population groups, including Westerners and local populations, which we combine with data on the identity of aid providers who visited each household. As long as the independent effect of the disaster on trust was equal for all population groups, the difference in trust toward foreigners versus local populations should allow us to net out the effect of the disaster on trust in general. In striking contrast to the increase in trust toward Westerners closer to the fault line, there is no link between trust in locals and distance to the fault line. Consequently, the difference between trust in Westerners and trust in locals increases closer to the fault line, suggesting that the trust increase in Westerners is more than a generalized disaster effect.
Second, Westerners were not the only groups providing aid in the region; relief from other organizations followed a similar pattern with respect to distance from the fault line. If trust in Westerners responds to aid provided by the Pakistan Army or expatriate Pakistanis, for example, separating out the part of the trust increase directly attributable to Western aid versus other types of aid requires as many sources of exogenous variation as sources of aid. We do not have these additional sources of variation in our data, but we present suggestive correlational evidence that such cross-group effects between trust and aid, whereby aid by one group increased trust in the other, were likely small. Specifically, the presence of Western aid providers has a large and independent impact on trust in Westerners, and including this variable eliminates the relationship between exposure to the earthquake shock and trust. In addition, trust in Westerners reacts only to the presence of Westerners, not to other forms of aid.
We interpret these results within the framework of recent literature on media, confirmatory bias, and the malleability of beliefs in the face of exogenous shocks (Mullainathan & Shleifer, 2005; DellaVigna & Kaplan, 2007; Kamenica & Gentzkow, 2011) . In Mullainathan and Shleifer's (2005) model, individuals obtain direct utility from confirming their prior beliefs, and the media can slant news stories to cater to these beliefs. In populations with diverse views, the media segments the market and moves to extreme positions. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) estimate such a model in the U.S. market for news and show that readers exhibit preferences for news that caters to their own viewpoint, and the media responds to readers' preferences.
3 The key insight from these models is that if people receive news and views from sources that they choose themselves, their beliefs can be biased in the short and long run.
An important implication is that when individuals exogenously receive news and interact with views that are different from what they would choose themselves, their beliefs can change. Examples from the U.S. market for news include Gerber, Karlan, and Bergan (2009) and DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) . In the context of Muslim populations, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004) note that CNN watchers are less anti-American than Al Jazeera watchers, although they do not claim causality for this result. Clingingsmith, Khwaja, and Kremer (2009) demonstrate such causality by comparing successful and unsuccessful Pakistani applicants to the Hajj pilgrimage lottery. They show that those who undertook the pilgrimage returned with a greater tolerance toward female education and employment, and an increased belief in equality, notably, among believers of different religions.
Our evidence follows from precisely such a ''natural'' experiment that is directly linked to the provision of foreign aid. Under business as usual, households receive their news and views from biased sources that are persuasive or confirm their own prior beliefs (local mosques are one important channel of such news). 4 The earthquake caused a severe rupture in local news sources, and households were suddenly exposed, in a manner not of their choosing, to foreign populations with 3 In DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) individuals receive news from a source that they realize may be biased, but discount the extent of bias due to the powers of persuasion. In the short run, both rational Bayesian updaters and those subject to persuasion may be swayed by the media as they have had insufficient time to update their beliefs. In the long run, rational updaters move toward unbiased views, but those subject to persuasion continue to hold biased views even after receiving numerous (infinite) media reports. Note that if actions are not linear in beliefs, a different set of results may obtain (see Kamenica & Gentzkow, 2011) . 4 To understand the sources of biased news, Blaydes and Linzer (2012) highlight the significant variation within the Muslim world in trust toward Westerners and suggest that competition between Islamists and secularistnationalists plays a major role in forming public opinion in Muslim countries. Both political factions foster anti-American rhetoric to build support: ''Simply put, the reason many Muslims tell public opinion researchers that they hold an unfavorable opinion of the United States is because trusted political leaders tell them so.'' 372 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS whom they interacted extensively for some time. These interactions altered population attitudes and built local trust in foreign populations, including Westerners. Low levels of trust in Muslim populations toward Westerners and the increase in trust with exogenous new information are both consistent with this broader framework of media slant and confirmatory bias. The durability of this change is especially remarkable in an overall environment of low trust, increasing terrorism, and worsening relationships between Pakistan and the West.
5
In terms of policy, the link between foreign aid and trust arises frequently in the context of fragile states and conflict situations, but remains difficult to assess empirically due to identification concerns and problems with identifying the ultimate beneficiaries. The combination of exogenous variation in aid with unique data on aid recipients that forms the core of our empirical strategy mirrors Berman, Shapiro, and Felter (2011) , who show that improved service delivery in Iraq reduced insurgent violence. Like Berman et al. (2011) , our positive results on the effect of aid temper the current aid pessimism but also suggest that person-to-person contact, rather than overall financial support to a country, may be a critical factor in altering population attitudes (see Berman, Felter, & Shapiro, 2015 , for a discussion).
We emphasize that our results are inconsistent with the belief that low trust of the West among Muslims arises from deeply rooted population preferences and beliefs as in Huntington's (1993) ''clash of civilizations.'' It is also inconsistent with the notion that low trust reflects unease with global American policies toward the Islamic world (Fuller, 2002; Abdallah, 2003) . Neither school of thought allows for local actions by foreigners to have an impact on local preferences, either because Muslim preferences are nonmalleable or because Muslim distrust is fed by global policies. Our results are more optimistic and provide a valuable corrective against the increasing vitriol toward Muslim populations in recent times.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section II presents the context of the Pakistan earthquake of 2005 and the data. Section III discusses the estimation methodology, and section IV presents the results. Section V concludes with a brief discussion of the implications.
II. The Pakistan Earthquake of 2005
On October 8, 2005, a powerful earthquake that measured 7.6 on the Richter scale struck northern Pakistan. An estimated 74,000 Pakistanis died, 70,000 were seriously injured, and over 2.8 million were left homeless. The 2005 earthquake was the first to strike after a long period of relative calm. Between 1935 and 2005, there were no earthquakes above magnitude 7.0 in Pakistan; a smaller 6.2 magnitude earthquake in the North-West Frontier Province in 1974 affected other districts. One reason that population characteristics may be uncorrelated with distance to the fault line is that although such large earthquakes are infrequent, there are still over thirty active fault lines (figure 1) in this region and no geological reason why one fault line may rupture relative to another. Therefore, most households are living close to some fault line with an equal probability of rupture. This contrasts, for example, with the San Andreas fault line in California, which is clearly visible as a potential rupture source with a history.
Immediately following the earthquake, relief and aid poured in from the rest of Pakistan and around the world. In addition to financial support, organizations and individuals provided on-the-ground logistic and technical assistance, ranging from specialized services in medicine, excavation, and 5 Our results could also be consistent with changes in preferences through the intergroup contact hypothesis, which is widely discussed in the political science literature (see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) . Under intergroup contact theory, interactions affect attitudinal preferences, and this leads to policy actionable steps that can be taken (for instance) to reduce bias and discrimination. The attitudinal change we document is consistent with this hypothesis among large populations, but whether we should view trust as a belief or a preference (our measure focuses more on the former) is a complex issue that we do not address here. (See, e.g., Sapienza, Toldra-Simats, & Zingales, 2013.) 373 IN AID WE TRUST evacuation to emergency shelters and food. U.S. aircraft alone flew more than 4,000 sorties, delivering over 11,000 tons of relief supplies, U.S. medical units treated 32,000 patients, and crews cleared more than 50,000 metric tons of debris (U.S. Agency for International Development, 2006) . This direct aid from foreign organizations was neither strategic nor politically motivated. The U.S. response to the earthquake was rapid and unequivocal in terms of its humanitarian aims. Two days after the earthquake struck (when the full severity was unknown), the U.S. embassy in Islamabad provided $100,000 for immediate relief, an amount that increased Focus groups in the earthquake-affected regions echoed similar perceptions of the aid: ''There was a near unanimous sentiment by local respondents that these organizations responded for humanitarian reasons rather than to promote hidden political, cultural or religious agendas. There was also a strong perception that international aid workers were generally culturally sensitive'' (Wilder, 2008) . In the context of the models of bias and updating, the aid and presence of foreigners is then regarded as an unbiased provision of aid for humanitarian purposes rather than an attempt to buy hearts and minds.
The significant presence of foreigners on the ground declined five months after the event and officially ended after the first six months, with the United States wrapping up its relief operation on March 30, 2006. Our paper focuses specifically on foreign aid efforts in rescue, relief, and rehabilitation in the first five months after the earthquake instead of long-term reconstruction, where all foreign aid was exclusively managed and channeled to local populations by the government of Pakistan and its functionaries.
A. Data
We implemented two data collection exercises in the four worst-affected districts of the region between June 2009 and March 2010. For both activities, we relied on a local team of enumerators and supervisors, led by a local survey firm (RCONS) with which we had worked extensively and trained for both this survey and prior surveys since 2003. Across these four districts, we randomly sampled 126 villages that ranged from within 1 kilometer (km) to 75 km from the fault line, with the average household 17.5 km from the fault line and 36.4 km from the epicenter (table 1) . Within each village, we first completed a short census of all 28,297 households that included geographic coordinates, basic household characteristics, and the identity of organizations that helped the household in the first five months after the earthquake. For a randomly selected 6,455 households, a long form of the census was completed that also included data on home destruction and mortality. The online appendix discusses both the sampling and the validity of the randomization for the long-form census.
For the second data collection exercise, we randomly selected 2,456 households for a detailed follow-up on the impact of the earthquake and post-earthquake recovery. This survey included questions on trust and perceptions of kindness toward outsiders, as well as a risk tolerance game, yielding 4,672 individual observations of trust attitudes and risk behaviors. Of these, 48% (2,312) were from male respondents, and 48% of the respondents reported primary education, more so for men (64%) than women (31%: see table 1).
We complement the survey data with a digital mapping of all fault lines in the region, including the activated BalakotBagh fault, from geological surveys (figure 1). We compute the distance for every household to the epicenter and to every fault line using the Haversine formula.
7 These spatial data are supplemented with data on the average slope of the terrain in the area defined by a union council (an administrative grouping of 4 or 5 geographically contiguous villages) to account for the hilliness of the terrain. We also use villagelevel data from the 1998 village population census, together with retrospective information from the household survey in 2009, to assess preexisting correlations between socioeconomic characteristics and earthquake intensity. Finally, a 2011 survey, which we conducted, of 112 villages in the province of Punjab, which was unaffected by the earthquake, provides further context for our results on trust and attitudes. Aid providers. To identify aid providers in our census, each of the 28,297 households was asked to ''name organizations or people that came to your help within the first five months after the earthquake.'' Responses were unrestricted, and there were no limits on the number of relief providers that could be listed, resulting in the identification of 203 distinct names of organizations or groups. Respondents named specific organizations (e.g., Doctors Without Borders or Islamic Relief), but also used more generic terms such as ''a Japanese NGO.'' The response ''no one came'' was also a potential answer. We hand-coded all responses into the categories used here, focusing in particular on aid provided by Western aid agencies. 8 In these data, the mean number of organizations reported per village was 13.2, with some villages reporting 45 different relief groups. The Pakistani Army was the dominant relief provider, and 64% of all households report that the army came to help (table 1). The second largest single category is ''Other aid,'' which includes any group that was not explicitly Western or army, including the U.N., other Pakistani government agencies, Pakistani NGO groups, and Islamic relief agencies (such as Islamic Relief and Muslim Aid and relief agencies in countries like Turkey). 9 The bulk of foreign aid, however, came from the inflow of Western aid workers, reported by 25% of the sample. Our analysis highlights this aspect of aid as opposed to the U.N., which has a permanent presence in Pakistan and is staffed with local people, and the Islamic Relief contingent, which was staffed in many cases with expatriate Pakistanis.
Population attitudes. Three questions in the household survey measure population attitudes. The first elicits trust: Distance to fault line and epicenter calculated using Haversine formula. Household census conducted among all households in 126 randomly selected survey villages. Detailed census conducted among randomly selected 6,455 subset. Household survey conducted among randomly selected 2,456 subset. Household Asset Index is the first principal component of household assets recorded in the household survey: beds/charpais, tables, chairs, fans, sewing machines, books, refrigerators, radio/cassette recorder/CD players, televisions, VCR/VCDs, watches, guns, plows, tractors, tube well/hand pumps, other agricultural machinery, other agricultural hand tools/saws, motorcycle/scooters, car/taxi/vehicles, bicycles, cattle, goats, chickens, and mobile phones. Gender, age, and education summary statistics reported for living adults (age 18þ) from the 2009 survey. Of the 4,672 individuals who were respondents to the trust, kindness, and risk survey, 62 individuals from 33 households are excluded from analysis due to unreliable GPS coordinates.
9 Even where they were most active, less than 10% of households report receiving assistance from militant organizations. For instance, Lashkar-eTayyeba (LeT) is recognized as a terrorist organization by a number of nations but also acknowledged for its charity work following the earthquake (see, e.g., Coll, 2008 ). Yet of the 28,297 households surveyed, less than 1% (268 households) identified LeT's presence in the first five months after the earthquake.
IN AID WE TRUST
''Imagine you are walking down a street and dropped a Rs.1000 note without noticing.
[Name] was walking behind you without you knowing and picked it up. Would they return the money to you?'' We label the other two questions ''helpfulness/kindness'' and ''work compatibility.'' The second question asks: ''After the earthquake, your opinion of the helpfulness and kindness of [Name] is ______,'' and the third asks: ''Do you feel that the ability of different religions, nationalities, and races to work together for a common cause is _______? '' In the first two questions, [Name] refers to nine different population groups: (a) people in general; (b) your extended family; (c) people in your village; (d) people in your qaum/ caste/clan/biradari (qaum translates roughly as clan and biradari as the kinship group); (e) people in your region; (f) other Pakistanis; (g) general foreigners; (h) Europeans/ Americans; and (i) Islamic foreigners. Europeans and Americans are treated together as one group because households were unable to distinguish between them, referring to both as the equivalent of ''Westerners.'' Unlike the first two questions, the third question (an ability to work together) does not specify any specific population group. While for the first two questions, we may expect a tight correspondence between trust in a specific group and aid from that group, for the third question, aid from a variety of foreign organizations may have a positive impact on the response.
The trust question has a binary response. For the work compatibility question, responses were coded on a 5-point Likert scale, and for the second question, the responses were coded as differences (much worse than before to much better than before). For analysis, we reduce these to binary classifications, although our results are unaltered if we use all five categories.
A potential issue is that our trust question departs from that asked in the World Values Survey (WVS): ''Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?'' It is therefore fair to ask whether our question captures trust in the way that is usually imagined. We postpone a broader discussion on precisely what our questions capture (as well as the possibility that this reflects income differences in the populations) until after the results, but we note that this ties into a broader discussion in the literature on the disconnect between survey approaches and experimental games in the measurement of trust (see Sapienza et al., 2013 , for a discussion). One hypothesized reason for the discrepancy is that experimental games confound preferences (such as risk aversion or other-regarding preferences) with beliefs.
To address this, Sapienza et al. (2013) argue that the best measure of beliefs is the expectation that money will be returned in a trust game, which is what we try to capture with our question. We were encouraged that in our data, the standard correlates of trust (e.g., education and gender) behave similarly to our trust question as in the literature that uses the WVS question instead. Furthermore, in 2011, we included our trust question together with the WVS question in a separate survey in Punjab, a distinct geographical region. In these data, responses based on our trust question and the WVS question match closely for trust in ''people from the own region'' and ''foreigners,'' although the latter leads to slightly higher levels of trust for ''people from the own village'' and ''caste/clan.'' Correlations at the respondent level range from 0.27 to 0.51, depending on which group is considered. All correlations are significant at the 99% level of confidence.
C. Summary Statistics on Population Attitudes
A startling statistic in our data is that trust in people from the respondent's own village, people from the same caste or clan, and people from the same region is exceptionally low. In our sample, 17.3% (29.9%) thought that people from the ''same region'' (''same caste or clan'') would return the money, which is remarkably consistent with the 31% who respond positively when asked whether most people can be trusted in the WVS. They are also consistent with our results from Punjab in a completely separate, unaffected sample. There, 18% of respondents trust people from the same region, although trust in people from the respondent's own village (37%) or caste or clan (45%) was higher.
In comparison, only 5% in Punjab report that ''general foreigners'' and 7% that Europeans and Americans can be trusted. In the earthquake regions, trust in foreigners is markedly different: 46% say that foreigners can be trusted, with higher numbers (48.3%) for trust in Europeans and Americans, topping out at 61.3% for Islamic foreigners. The pattern of responses for the trust question is similar to that for the kindness and helpfulness of strangers: respondents are far more likely to believe that foreigners and outsiders are kinder and more helpful than people from their own region. We will show that this large difference is causally linked with exposure to the earthquake.
III. Empirical Methodology
Specifications that regress population attitudes on foreigner presence, potentially controlling for other covariates, are likely biased if aid is given to households and villages that trust foreigners more or are more open to outsiders. These are non-time-varying omitted variables. Further, the intensity of the earthquake itself could have affected trust levels if large losses lead individuals to seek assistance and trust others more (Fleming, Chong, & Bejarano, 2014) .
We therefore proceed in two steps. We first argue that the earthquake led to an increase in local trust toward Westerners. We argue that this is a causal result. Specifically, we regress:
where T ijk is the response to the trust question toward group k (Westerners in this instance) for individual i in village j, D ij is the distance of individual i in village j from the acti-376 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS vated fault line; X i is a vector of individual characteristics such as age, education, and wealth of individual i; and Y j are village characteristics that include the average slope of the union council and district dummies as additional controls. Finally, v j is a village-specific, y i an individual-specific, and e ijk an idiosyncratic error term. Any correlation between the error terms, v i , y j , e ijk , and D ij will bias the coefficient, with the sign of the bias depending on the sign of the correlation. We will present test results to argue that this correlation is 0 in our context. Our choice of the distance to the fault line as the preferred measure of earthquake intensity is guided by both the geology of this earthquake and identification concerns. The Pakistan earthquake had a large surface rupture area along a sloping fault plane, and the epicenter rarely falls along the fault line as it is a surface marker of a subterranean event along a sloping plane (Kaneda et al., 2008) . Because the entire plate shifted (with the rupture point at the epicenter), the distance to the fault line is a better predictor of local intensity than the epicenter: ''Generally speaking, [distance to epicenter and hypocenter] are poor measures of distance for earthquakes with large rupture areas. [Commonly used is] the closest horizontal distance to the vertical projection of the rupture plane'' (Scawthorn & Chen, 2002 ). An alternate measure of exposure is the Mercalli intensity, or USGS ''ShakeMap'' cartography, for the affected region. Our preference for the simpler distance measure is due to the exogeneity requirement: the localized ground shaking that results from an earthquake is a complex combination of the distance from the fault line, the specific geology of the fault (in this earthquake, villages on the ''hanging wall'' side, which were on the plane that actually moved, suffered greater damage), and the characteristics of the local soil and physical characteristics that may be correlated to socioeconomic characteristics. For instance, moist soils such as clay lose their cohesion following an earthquake and can lead to additional damage as they become liquid. However, soil type is also directly correlated to agricultural yield and building suitability. We therefore sacrifice precision in the measurement of earthquake intensity in favor of the exogeneity that the distance to the fault line grants us and that we verify in the data. Although using the Mercalli intensity instead does not affect our results, the Mercalli intensity is correlated with pre-earthquake housing characteristics and population size, making it a poor candidate for exogenous variation in the earthquake shock. (See the online appendix for a full discussion and results using the Mercalli intensity instead.)
Earthquakes also differ from other natural disasters in several ways that aid identification. First, unlike predicted disasters like hurricanes, earthquakes are unanticipated, precluding the possibility of heterogeneous household movements in response to forecasts. Second, although mortality was high in the earthquake, even closest to the fault line, it never exceeded 5.3% of the population. Because mortality may be selective, natural disasters with high mortality induce additional selection concerns; for instance, the Aceh tsunami of 2004 led to mortality rates as high as 30% to 35% close to the sea in Indonesia (Frankenburg et al., 2011) . Third, very large aid efforts may lead to spillovers into less affected areas over time. Unlike the tsunami in Aceh, where international aid mobilization was $7.7 billion in a concentrated geographical space, with some evidence of aid spillover, the Pakistan earthquake aid was limited after the initial phase. Consequently, four years after the earthquake, cumulative aid to families that were farther away was significantly lower, and essentially decreased to 0 at 40 km from the fault line (Andrabi, Daniels, & Das, 2017) . The lack of predictability, low mortality, and minimal aid spillovers are critical to identify the effect of the event on local populations.
In terms of channels, the coefficient on the distance from the fault line b captures both the effect of aid and the generalized effect of the earthquake shock on trust. To argue that b does not capture a general earthquake effect on overall trust, we reestimate equation (1) using the difference between trust in foreigners and trust in locals as the dependent variable:
In equation (2),
Trust ij is the difference in trust between group k and group k 0 (Westerners and locals), and under the assumption (a) that the generalized effect of the disaster on trust is captured through the impact on trust in local populations and (b) that fixed characteristics affect trust in different groups identically, the estimated coefficient b 0 represents the effect of the earthquake on trust in Westerners. In this first-difference specification, the estimated coefficient b is purged of the generalized effect of the disaster on trust.
Showing that Western aid was the only channel of aid through which trust in Westerners increased is more difficult. Although aid from Western relief agencies followed a similar pattern with respect to the fault line as trust in Westerners (increasingly rapidly in villages closer to the faultline), so did other forms of aid. If there are cross-group effects in aid and trust, we cannot rule out that aid from non-Western agencies was ultimately what led to an increase in trust in Westerners. We do, however, present suggestive correlations to rule out large cross-group effects, aiding our interpretation that it was the relief and aid by Westerners that mattered.
IV. Results

A. Distance to the Fault Line and Preexisting
Characteristics of the Population Each row reports coefficients from individual regressions of the outcome on distance to the fault line, distance to the epicenter, and the main slope of the UC. All regressions control for district fixed effects, and errors are clustered at the level of the village. Village information is sourced from the most recent national census in 1998. Individual information is calculated for those who were adults (18 and over) at the time of the earthquake. Household information is taken from the 2009 survey. Distances in minutes to public infrastructure are based on recall questions; missing observations are recorded when the respondent did not know the location. Measured distances are based on the geolocated survey of public infrastructure and can include facilities in a different village from the household. Distance to nearest water source is replaced by 0 when the household survey reported water in the household. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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tance to the epicenter, and the average slope of the union council (UC). We find small and statistically insignificant correlations for pre-earthquake household and individual characteristics, whether we use the 1998 population census data (panel A) or our own earthquake census and household survey data (panel B). In panel C, we again find no correlation between distance to the fault line and self-reported travel time to private or public schools, water pumps, medical facilities, or markets prior to the earthquake (all measured using retrospective questions), although households that lived farther from the fault line were less likely to report that they had electricity. Nevertheless, a couple of results are of concern. First, we computed the distance from each household to the preearthquake locations of different types of infrastructure, which we elicited from focus groups followed by physical verification. There is no correlation between distance to the fault line and the closest water source or girls' school. However, villages that were farther from the fault line were also farther from a health clinic and private schools. These correlations stem primarily from two remote villages that are more than 50 km from the fault line in an extremely mountainous part of the province. Among the remaining 124 villages, only the coefficient for health clinics remains significant (p ¼ 0.07); the rest are statistically insignificant at conventional levels (e.g., p ¼ 0.31 for private schools).
Second, although most village and household coefficients are not statistically significant, many of them have the same negative sign. We regressed the distance to the fault line on all the characteristics to test whether the coefficients were jointly significant. We are unable to reject the null hypothesis of joint insignificance for 25 characteristics, with an Fstatistic of 1.29 and a corresponding p-value of 0.18. Taken together, village and household data appear to confirm that preexisting characteristics were not systematically correlated with distance to the fault line, although, given the nature of the districts, two villages that were more than 50 km away may have been systematically more remote and mountainous. All of the results we present are fully robust to the exclusion of these two villages from our sample. Figures 2, 3, and 4 show the nonparametric relationships between the distance to the fault line, destruction, aid, and trust (appendix tables A6 and A7 show the corresponding regressions for destruction and aid). Of the 2,393 deaths reported among the 141,309 individuals alive during the earthquake in the household census, 1,218 occurred within 5 km of the fault line where the shock was most intense; 13.1% of households within 5 km of the fault line report a death due to the earthquake, with mortality tapering off farther from the fault line (figure 2). Among the adult populations we are interested in, the earthquake mortality rate within 5 km was 3.1%; we address the implications of this potentially selective mortality in section IV.
Most deaths were due to the collapse of housing structures, with 84.8% of households reporting complete destruction of their homes within 5 km of the earthquake. Since the quality of the pre-earthquake housing as reported in the 1998 population census and in our own survey is uncorrelated with the fault line, this is a causal effect of the earthquake shock and not due to differential housing quality closer to the fault line. Housing destruction declines with distance from the fault line, dropping to about 60% at a distance of 20 km from the fault line and farther to about 15% at 40 km from the fault line. House destruction is similar to Figures show the nonparametric relationship between house damage and destruction, individual death during the earthquake, and village facility destruction with distance (km) from the activated fault line. The histograms show the relative densities of households, individuals, and villages (axis scale not shown). Relationships are fit using locally weighted polynomial smoothing. Home destruction and damage data are sourced from the detailed census and the household survey, mortality data are sourced from the household census, and facilities destruction is sourced from the village infrastructure survey. 379 IN AID WE TRUST the destruction of other facilities, with an average of 56.2% of facilities completely destroyed in villages closest to the fault line. Columns 1 to 4 in appendix table A6 show the regression equivalents to these statistics, where we note in addition that the distance to the epicenter is insignificant and houses were more likely to collapse in hillier regions as measured by the average slope of the union council. Figure 3 shows the large presence of organizations in the hardest-hit areas close to the fault line. Virtually none of the households in the census claim that no aid came in the immediate vicinity of the fault line. The army's presence does decline with distance, but hovers around 50% with the exception of a few villages around 30 km and 50 km from the fault line, confirming its wide leadership in earthquake relief. Western organizations were a significant presence in the region, and substantially more so close to the fault line, with a sharp drop-off to 0 at a distance of 30 km. Regression estimates at the household level (column 2 of appendix table A7) show that a 10 km increase in distance from the fault line decreased the probability of a household reporting that a Westerner came by 6 percentage points. Figure 4 is a succinct visual of our key findings. Here we plot nonparametrically the relationship between distance and trust in various groups (Westerners, foreigners in general, and own region), as well as the relationship between distance and aid from Westerners shown above. Several features are noteworthy. First, measured trust in foreigners mirrors the gradient of foreign presence with distance from the fault line: it is 63% in the immediate vicinity of the fault line, dropping to 50% and then 35% at distances of 20 km and 40 km, respectively. This difference in trust levels is similar to the difference between Pakistan and Sweden at the bottom and top of the WVS country-level trust estimates. Second, the sharp discontinuity that we see in foreign presence (dropping to 0 at around 25 km) mirrors the discontinuity in the trust-distance relationship for both Westerners and foreigners in general. Third, there is almost no relationship between trust in people from the region and distance to the fault line. The lack of this relationship extends to all local groups, as shown in appendix figure A3 . Both the nonlinearity evident in the trust-distance and aiddistance relationships and the fact that trust in locals does not change with distance to the fault line suggest that the increase in trust in foreigners is not a general effect of disasters on attitudes but something that is plausibly attributable to Western aid. Table 3 reports regression estimates of population trust attitudes on earthquake intensity. We estimate trust in dif- The figure shows positive responses to the question: ''Imagine you are walking down a street and dropped a Rs. 1000 note without noticing. ___ was walking behind you without you knowing and picked it up. Will they return it to you?'' Fits are locally weighted polynomials against distance (km) to the fault line. The solid line shows the proportion of households reporting Western aid after the earthquake. The histogram is the density of trust respondents (scale not shown). N ¼ 4,610 trust respondents and 28,297 households.
C. Regression Analysis
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ferent population groups as a function of the distance from the fault line, geographical controls, and household and individual characteristics. Conditional variables in our specification include sex, education, and wealth-variables that have been shown to have an impact on trust in other studies. 10 The correlations with these other variables are very similar to those that have been previously documented using the WVS trust question in survey contexts.
A decrease of 10 km in the distance to the fault line increases trust in Westerners by 5 percentage points (p.p.), and in foreigners in general by 6 p.p. (table 3, columns 1 and 2). Results are similar for the question on the belief in different groups to work together (column 4), which increases by 3 p.p. for every 10 km move in proximity toward the fault line. Put another way, trust in Westerners increases by 11 p.p. (23%) as we move from the 75th to the 25th percentile of the distance distribution (28 km versus 7 km). In terms of characteristics, men, the rich, and those who are more educated trust more, a reassuring result since it is in line with results from other studies that use the WVS trust question.
Column 3 shows the sharp contrast with trust in local populations. For brevity we report results for ''own region, '' with results for all other local population groups in appendix table A8. As is clear, there is no relationship between trust and distance to the fault line, with the measured distance effect close to 0 and statistically insignificant; we can rule out a coefficient larger than 3 p.p. with 95% confidence. This difference is strongly suggestive that the increase in the trust in foreigners is not a generalized disaster effect but a direct result of greater help from foreigners into the village. Column 5 estimates the differenced specification, using the difference between trust in Westerners and trust in people from their ''own region,'' the only coefficient that declines with distance and therefore the most conservative difference estimate. Again, the differenced coefficient is highly significant and qualitatively large. Finally, columns 6 and 7 show a strong nonlinearity in the differenced trust specification but not in the ability to work together.
11
Appendix table A9 replicates the linear patterns for attitudes measured as belief in the kindness and helpfulness of strangers. We note that here, the results for foreigners in Columns 1-3 have as dependent variables the answer to the question: ''Imagine you are walking down a street and dropped a Rs. 1000 note without noticing. ____ was walking behind you without you knowing and picked it up. Will they return it to you?'' The dependent variable in columns 4 and 7 is, ''Do you feel that the ability of different religions, nationalities, races to work together for a common cause is . . .'' with responses ''High'' and ''Very High'' on a 5-point Likert scale coded as positive. Columns 5 and 6 use the difference between the questions from columns 2 and 3. Distances from the fault and the epicenter are calculated using the 2009 District Household Census and digital maps of the Himalayan frontal thrust provided by NESPAK. The slope is the mean of the union council provided by NESPAK. Other variables are from the District Household Survey 2009. The omitted wealth indicator variable is the highest asset tercile. The regressions also include a full set of age and district indicator variables (coefficients not reported). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. general and for Westerners are smaller, and those for Westerners are no longer significant; we discuss the implications in section IVE.
We then test whether these results are driven by potential differences in population characteristics of those who choose to live close to a fault line. In appendix table A10, we include different measures of household earthquake exposure risk as additional variables. These include distance to the closest fault line and number of fault lines within different radii of the household. In all specifications, controlling for the average earthquake risk in this manner has no impact on the relationship between the distance to the activated fault line and trust. As in table 3, those living closer to the activated fault line trusted foreigners more after four years relative to those living farther away, even if those living farther away were living equally close to a (nonactivated) fault line.
To explore further whether foreign presence is the key channel, table 4 presents correlations assessing whether the effect of the distance to the fault line is mediated through the presence of aid and, if so, what type of aid. We look at our three classifications of aid and the direct correlation between the fraction of households reporting that aid and trust in different groups. The key result is the following: army aid and ''other aid'' as controls (either individually or together) have no direct impact on trust in Westerners and no impact of the coefficient of trust in Westerners and distance. In sharp contrast, the fraction of the village reporting Western aid is directly correlated with trust in Westerners and halves the coefficient between distance and trust in Westerners, rendering it statistically insignificant. The results are similar for the ability to work together and for the difference in trust between Westerners and locals, although note that ability to work together also responds to ''other aid.'' This is expected, as we did not distinguish between different groups for this question. The relationship between distance to the fault line and trust in foreigners therefore appears to be mediated by the greater presence of Western foreign organizations but not other types of aid, and, at least in correlations, the distance-trust relationship becomes small and insignificant once we control for the intensity of foreign presence. Estimated coefficients are reported from specifications that correlate trust with distance to the fault and aid controls. Panel A adds controls for the fraction of the village that reported aid from the Pakistan army, panel B for Western organizations other than the U.N., panel C for all other sources, and panel D as a single combined regression. Each regression in columns 1-3 has as its dependent variable the binary-coded answer to the trust question. The dependent variable in column 4 is the working-together question, and in column 5, the difference between the answers to the trust questions from columns 2 and 3. Regressions also include controls for education, asset tercile, gender, distance to epicenter, and local slope as in table 3. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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The fact that aid by one group does not seem to increase trust in another motivates an instrumental variables (IV) specification, which we present in table 5. Here, we regress trust against the proportion of the village reporting Western using the distance to the fault line as an instrument.
12 Columns 1 to 3 do not control for other types of aid, while columns 4 and 5 reestimate the specifications in columns 1 and 3 with additional controls for other aid. The trust-aid relationship is exceptionally robust and suggests that moving from 0% to 100% of the village reporting Western aid increases trust in Westerners by 51.3 to 54 percentage points in differenced specifications. Controls for other types of aid do not affect this relationship, consistent with the results from table 4. Finally, note in column 2 that the IV estimate for trust in people from their own region is small and insignificant.
Appendix tables A11 and A12 present additional estimates of the differential impact for educated (versus uneducated) respondents and for men (versus women). There is little heterogeneity by level of education or gender with the exception of the work-compatibility question (columns 4-6), where the effect of the earthquake appears to have been larger for those who had completed primary school and for men (columns 7-9). Since men are more likely to have primary education, we used regressions with both sets of interactions and find that the differential effect of distance is due only to gender, with no effect of education within each sex (results available with authors).
D. Robustness
Our robustness exercise revolves around three potential sources of biases in our results: the relationship between population attributes and trust the role of migration and selective mortality, and the nature of reporting bias in our measure of the presence of foreign organizations.
Trust and population attributes: Risk aversion. Recent literature suggests that exposure to disasters and conflict increases risk aversion (Cameron & Shah, 2015; Callen et al., 2014) . There is also evidence that risk aversion and trust are related (Karlan, 2005) . If increased risk aversion decreases trust in locals relative to outsiders, we would observe the patterns documented above. In appendix table A13, we add in household choices to a hypothetical riskaversion game as additional controls and find no change in Estimated coefficients are reported from specifications that correlate trust with the proportion of the respondent's village reporting Western aid (instrumented by distance to the activated fault) and other geographic and aid controls. The regressions in columns 1 and 4 have as the dependent variable the binary-coded answer to the question: ''Imagine you are walking down a street and dropped a Rs. 1000 note without noticing.
[A Westerner] was walking behind you without you knowing and picked it up. Will they return it to you?'' Columns 2 and 3 use as a dependent variable the same question for ''someone from your own region.'' The dependent variable in columns 3 and 6 is the difference between columns 1 and 2. Distances from the fault and the epicenter are calculated using the 2009 District Household Census and digital maps of the Himalayan frontal thrust provided by NESPAK. The slope is the mean slope of the union council of the village from digital maps provided by NESPAK. Other variables from the District Household Survey 2009. The omitted wealth indicator variable is the highest asset tercile. The regressions also include a full set of age and district indicator variables (coefficients not reported). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
12 We could also report IV estimates for the ''ability to work together,'' but choose not to do so since it is affected by multiple types of aid in table 4. 383 IN AID WE TRUST the overall relationship between trust and the distance from the fault line, thus ruling out differences in risk attitudes as a confounding factor.
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Trust and population attributes: Income. Because of our specific trust question, if the respondent assumes that local people close to the fault line need money more than a foreigner or a person from outside the local region, our results are not indicative of trust in general. This is likely if the loss in income from the earthquake persisted to 2009. In fact, in related work, we find that consumption levels (logarithms) in 2009 are uncorrelated to distance from the fault line at all conventional levels of significance, with an estimated coefficient of 0.003 and a p-value of 0.213, which we attribute to the significant aid and relief efforts in the region (Andrabi, Daniels, & Das, 2017 ). Thus, current income differentials related to distance from the fault line cannot explain our main result. It is still possible that this mechanism is at play if lagged income matters, and we cannot rule out this alternate channel. Neither are we able to rule out the possibility that households updated their beliefs about the incomes of foreigners upward after interacting with them, although we note that results using the nonmonetary questions yielded broadly similar conclusions.
Selective mortality and migration. A second concern is that our results are biased due to higher mortality or migration among those who trusted Westerners less. Table 6 takes an agnostic view on selective mortality and presents extreme bounds using a binary classification for distance, with the cut-point for ''close to the fault line'' at 20 km (column 1, table 6 replicates the trust-distance relationship using this binary classification of distance). The lower bounds assume that all who died close to the fault line would have mistrusted Westerners and all who died far from the fault line would have trusted them; for upper bounds, we reverse these assumptions. Under these extreme bounds, the results on ''Any Foreigner'' remain, but lower bounds on ''Westerners'' and the difference are no longer significant. Appendix figure A4 assesses the assumptions required on mortality selection for the lower bounds to retain statistical significance. If 85% (57%) of those who died close to the fault line mistrusted Westerners and vice versa for those far from it (instead of 100% in the extreme bounds), the lower bound is significant at the 90% (95%) confidence interval. Thus, a mild relaxation of the extreme bounds assumption restores 10% significance to our result.
With regard to selective migration, in the household survey, for all household members enumerated in the roster, we asked whether they lived in the same household at the time of the earthquake. We also listed all members who were living in the household at the time of the earthquake. Of the 4,876 living adults we listed close to the fault line in this inclusive method, 149 had moved out after the earthquake (3%) and 173 (3.5%) had moved in after the earthquake. The numbers and percentages are remarkably similar for those who lived far from the earthquake: of 2,888 individuals listed, 73 had moved in (2.5%) and 84 (2.9%) had moved out. In fact, we are unable to find any significant difference in migration status between individuals close to and far from the fault line (appendix table A14).
Reporting biases in the presence of foreign organizations. Systematic biases in self-reports manifested as pure measurement error will lead to attenuation bias, so that our estimates reflect a lower bound on the true effects. However, if the measurement error is systematically correlated with distance from the fault line such that those living farther from the fault line were more likely to forget assistance provided by foreigners relative to those living closer, our coefficient could be biased upward. To assess this possibility, we correlated our measure of foreign presence with an independent question in the survey that asked whether a Chinook (the U.S. helicopter used in the rescue efforts) landed in the village. Among helicopters, the Chinook is Estimated proximity-to-fault line coefficients are reported here from specifications that correlate trust with distance to the fault and other geographic controls. Linear distance is replaced by a ''near-earthquake'' indicator variable cutting the sample at 20 km. Manski bounds are calculated by replacing the missing trust indicator variable for deceased adults with extreme values and re-estimating the specification. For the lower bound (worst case), this imputes 0 for those near the fault (À1 for the difference specification) and 1 for those far from the fault; the reverse is done for the upper bound (best case). Distances from the fault and the epicenter are calculated using the 2009 District Household Census and digital maps of the Himalayan frontal thrust provided by NESPAK. The slope is the mean slope of the union council of the village from digital maps provided by NESPAK. Other variables from the District Household Survey 2009. The regressions also include distance to the nearest fault, distance to the epicenter, mean slope of the union council, gender, a full set of district indicators, wealth tercile, a full set of age indicator variables, and primary education (coefficients not reported). Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
13 In our sample, 21% (975 respondents) declined to play the game because gambling is forbidden in Islam. We do not find any correlation between the probability of playing the game and distance to the fault line, although individuals who refused to play the game also reported lower trust in foreigners.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS distinctive because of its two rotors, and respondents were shown a photograph of the Chinook at the time of the survey. The percentage of respondents answering that a Chinook landed in the village is strongly correlated with our measure of foreigner presence at the 99% level of confidence with standard controls for the overall volume of aid and district fixed effects (results not shown).
E. Interpretation
Our primary focus in this paper was to assess whether aid and relief distributed by foreigners after the earthquake resulted in positive and durable attitudinal changes in the population. Our specific trust question was designed to remove agency on the respondent's part as compared to the WVS question, thus diminishing reciprocity as a motive for returning the money. It therefore captures the essence of beliefs regarding the trustworthiness of others. For instance, with the typical WVS question, the respondent may assume a situation whereby she or he makes himself or herself ''vulnerable'' to future exploitation by those she or he trusted (Ashraf, Bohnet, & Piankov 2006) . Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) suggest, for instance, that the psychological costs of perceived betrayal may be closely related to trust. In an experimental setting, this is similar to the link between investment games and dictator games (Ashraf et al., 2006) .
We included multiple measures of attitudinal change to ensure that we were not confined to a single dimension and to check whether these alternate measures behaved similarly, adding robustness to our results. Our measures of trust in Westerners and kindness among Westerners are highly correlated (rho ¼ 0.42), although trust and the ability to work together have a correlation coefficient of only 0.07 (see appendix table A2). This is not surprising because the first two questions were asked of specific population groups, while ''ability to work together'' could be interpreted across multiple population groups. Further, all the measures vary similarly with distance to the fault line, although the kindness measure is smaller in magnitude and less precise.
Understanding why these measures behave differently requires a greater measurement focus, perhaps using experimental games such as Cox (2004) , which were hard to implement in this remote regions with considerable ongoing threat of violence. Neither do we have costly actions (by the respondent) that we can use to explore attitudinal change beyond the responses to our survey measures. We then have two options. The first is to give up on trying to interpret these measures separately and instead estimate the effect of the earthquake exposure on an index of attitudes, using, for instance, the average effect size in Clingingsmith et al. (2009) . When we do so, we find an equally strong effect with a coefficient of À.007 (compare to the trust effect of À.006) and p-value < .01. Such an approach would confirm broad-based attitudinal change in this population. Alternatively, we could privilege the trust measure as the primary outcome of interest and follow a strategy in the experimental games literature that exploits variation in outcomes between the standard trust investment and dictator games as in Ashraf et al. (2006) . To do so, we added the kindness measure as an additional control to our base specification and find that the trust coefficient declines by 20% but remains significant (b ¼ À0.004; p ¼ 0.018). Trust appears to capture something different from kindness and still responds to the aid and relief received from Westerners. Thus, our results demonstrate both broad attitudinal change but also different responses to different questions; how to further interpret these differential responses raises a set of questions that our study was not designed to answer.
We also clarify that deeming Westerners more trustworthy does not imply agreement with Western government policies or commonality of interests. Our results suggest that by deeming Westerners more trustworthy, respondents closer to the fault line recognize Westerners not just as extensions of their country's foreign policy but as possessing characteristics independent of other dimensions of Western government and institutional behavior.
V. Discussion and External Validity
The presence of Westerners in the earthquake-affected regions led to a significant positive change in the attitudes of the local Muslim population toward Westerners that remained four years after the earthquake. This malleability suggests that such attitudes are not rooted in deeply held, difficult-to-alter preferences. Yet the context of our study also limits extrapolation to other legitimate counterfactuals that may be of policy interest. Specifically, the effects are for a population that received aid at a time of extreme trauma, the earthquake and aid came together, and the aid was given in a manner that did not combine strategic with humanitarian objectives. Perhaps population attitudes changed precisely because this was a traumatized population and the relief effort was altruistic in nature. This allowed respondents to solve the difficult problem of parsing out strategic versus altruistic motivations for aid giving in favor of the latter. In the models of media bias, it is precisely when information is received from an unbiased source that populations update their beliefs.
Whether aid and foreign presence for a nontraumatized population are in general an effective lever to alter attitudes is difficult to answer in this context. These results, together with those from the conflict literature (Berman et al., 2015) , suggest that aid can have an impact on attitudes, but local presence, rather than government-to-government aid, is arguably what matters. In fact, the decline in trust even 40 km away suggests that trust does not spill over through the media or through direct communication even over small distances. What is less clear is whether the circumstances we study extend to a more strategic (cynical?) approach where aid is given precisely to alter attitudes in general populations.
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